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The term “clinic” is derived from the Greek word 
klinikos with the component part “klino” or “kline”, which 
means to lean or bed1. The image  of the doctor  leaning 
over  the patient,  examining it,  is very familiar to  most 
people. By extension, “clinic” could be understood as the 
practice of medicine at bedside. However, as we shall see, 
its scope is much broader.  
According to the Aurélio Dictionary of Brazilian Por-
tuguese2, medicine is the “art or science to prevent, cure, 
or mitigate diseases”. The Brazilian Dictionary of Medical 
Terms by Pinto3 defines medicine as the “art of knowing 
diseases, disorders, and illnesses – etiology, pathogenesis, 
diagnosis, prognosis, therapy, prevention.” These two defi-
nitions corroborate what Foucault pointed out in his book 
The Birth of the Clinic; i.e., that disease is the object of at-
tention of medicine4. However, other authors highlight 
the relevance of including the patient and the collective 
as objects of interest. Cunha5 understands Clinical Medi-
cine as a “complex interaction or an encounter between 
two singular subjects: a professional and a patient, a staff 
and a patient, a team and a collective”. Campos6 proposes 
the expansion of Clinical Medicine, “from its biomedical 
nucleus to the social and subjective aspects of each subject, 
respecting the unique characteristic of each case”. Accord-
ing to Foucault, clinical medicine was born in the 18th 
century, in the wake of modern science, when empiricism 
replaces metaphysics and philosophy. The observed fact 
became more important than the interpretation of disease. 
One of the cornerstones of this new science was the cre-
ation by Carl von Linné of a scientific nomenclature sys-
tem to classify animals and plants7. Before Linné, Thomas 
Sydenham and Sauvages from Montpellier tried to classify 
diseases, the first through the description of diseases and 
the second according to class, order, and gender, follow-
ing the same path of biologists’ classification of animals 
and plants8. Medicine adopted this classificatory model 
used by biologists and started naming diseases according 
to the same hierarchical logic, which remains the basis of 
medicine to the present day4,9. Another advance that has 
contributed to a fundamental change in disease perception 
was the development of pathological anatomy, which al-
lowed the correlation of signs and symptoms with changes 
in organs examined on the autopsy table or under the eye 
of the microscope8. These advances lead to the Clinic that 
prevails until today. According to Foucault, “an empirical 
process in which by looking at the patient we seek to dis-
cover the disease. The patient, in turn, is not involved in 
the disease rational, being regarded as an event outside of 
what he is experiencing. The paradoxical role of medicine 
is to neutralize the patient so that the optimal configura-
tion of disease takes on a shape that is concrete, free, total-
ized, and open to the order of essences. Therefore, we are 
not speaking about discovering a truth still unknown, but 
about a particular way to sort the truth already acquired, 
hidden, already present in the patient’s body. Anyone who 
wishes to understand the disease must subtract the indi-
vidual and his unique qualities; if the course of disease is 
not interrupted or disturbed by the patient, the immutable 
laws that determine it can be rapidly discovered”4. It is an 
ontological model in which “disease is an instance located 
in the body, which can be conceptually separated from the 
affected person”8. Campos10 recognizes an “anti-positivist 
dialectic of medicine that keeps the disease and discards 
any responsibility for the history of concrete subjects”. Ac-
cording to Foucault4, not even the fact of having an organ 
affected is necessary to define the disease. “The organs are 
solid supporters of the disease: they never constitute its in-
dispensable conditions.” Physical examination is nothing 
more than a method of investigating the concrete space 
of the body in order to establish the relationship between 
the phenomena, background, and disturbances observed 
to obtain a name: the name of the disease11. Ramos Jr.12, 
in his treatise on Semiotécnica da observação clínica (se-
miotechnique clinical observation), confirms that diseases 
rather than patients are the object of investigation: “The 
history should be obtained according to the information 
and composition of symptoms, so that the rationale for the 
required, anatomical, functional, and etiologic diagnosis is 
possible. All information or expressions not related to the 
organ pathophysiology must be purged”12. 
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The Clinic is based solely on the perceptual field, guid-
ed by the exercise of observation. According to Foucault, 
the physician’s eye is able to achieve “the general form of 
any scientific finding”:  the patient is observed as if he was 
a planet or a laboratory experiment. The physician’s eye is 
directed toward what is visible on the disease and occurs 
in the form of a “contact prior to any speech, free from the 
entanglements of language”4. The Clinic gives a new shape 
to things through the language of a “positive science”.  It is 
the concrete individual opening to the language of rational-
ity. The clinical tool is the empiricism, which supplanted 
the philosophical and metaphysical posture of the Middle 
Ages, coinciding with the emergence of modern science, 
anchored in the essential skill of observing the evidence, 
the object that can be perceived. It is considered that Medi-
cine became scientific when it became empirical, depart-
ing from theoretical and speculative Field. In the acclaimed 
Cecil: Tratado de Medicina Interna, Goldman and Ausiello 
insist on the relationship between medicine and modern 
science: “Medicine is a profession that incorporates science 
and scientific methods with the art of being a physician”13. 
In his speech at the first graduation class of the Faculty of 
Medicine and Surgery of São Paulo, Arnaldo Vieira de Car-
valho makes clear the belief in the power of positive science, 
the path to the truth: “In addition to relieving the physical 
ailments of the patient, the doctor is also responsible to 
restore the broken society and for the huge and complete 
task of sanitizing and improving the environment in which 
both evolve! Improving and modifying the environment in 
which we live or intend to live is a great problem. For Meta-
physica, he exceeds the limits of human strength, to be un-
enforceable  and even  unapproachable. For the real  man 
of science, however,  is not unenforceable or unapproach-
able. For you others, who are lovers of truth, my young col-
leagues, such a development will have especial charm, will 
be the beloved subject of reflection, and should be a point 
of honor to find a solution”14. Later in the text, he reduces 
the medical knowledge to the obedience of the laws of na-
ture: “You are physicians – you can not see in men more 
than a set of cells, more than higher animals. You are biolo-
gists – you can not conceive in the manifestations of these 
animals nothing but the psychochemical manifestations of 
a cluster of protoplasm; you can not find in such phenom-
ena more than the effects of the physics law, this unique and 
truthful science, which explains and clarifies everything 
without resorting to fantastic and absurd assumptions […] 
reduced the social improvement to a biological equation, 
no one other than the physician – always a supposed scien-
tist/biologist, and not one of those storytellers  focused on 
the life of animals – is more apt to provide the solution14”. 
The modern, positive science is the paradigm of the Clin-
ic15, as it defines problems, legitimate methods, and models. 
A Clinic that has experienced and continues experiencing 
a process of consolidation and strengthening in which na-
ture is forced to fit within the pre-established and relatively 
inflexible limits provided by the paradigm. 
It must be recognized that this Clinic, essentially em-
pirical, grounded in modern positive science, focused on 
signs and symptoms in the search for a name (the disease’s 
name), was effective to respond to various challenges of 
the health-disease process. For example, saying that a pa-
tient with fever, productive cough, and pulmonary rales 
has pneumonia (disease’s name) and prescribe antibiotics 
and observe the patient’s recovery in order to resume his 
daily activities is to realize the power of this Clinic. On the 
other hand, it is weak to account for claims that do not 
meet anatomical, functional or etiological diagnoses. 
Porter16 agrees that despite the extremely positive re-
sults obtained by empirical Clinic, the society recognizes 
gaps in its effectiveness. “Never have people in the West 
lived so long, or been so healthy, and never have medical 
achievements been so great. Yet, paradoxically, rarely has 
medicine drawn such intense doubts and disapproval as to-
day. No one could deny that the medical breakthroughs of 
the past 50 years – the culmination of a long tradition 
of scientific medicine – have saved more lives than those of 
any era since the dawn of medicine”.
Starfield17 recognizes differences in the demands pre-
sented to the specialist and primary care. According to the 
author, “Primary health care involves the management of 
patients who often have multiple diagnoses and confound-
ing complaints, which can not be fitted into known diag-
nostic”. In this level of care, the more ‘rebel’ demands not 
fitting the known diagnostic seem to emerge or manifest 
with greater freedom, challenging professionals from pri-
mary care units. In specialized care, the diagnostic process 
grounded in observation and pathophysiology predomi-
nates; therefore, demands that are not resolved by this pro-
cess tend to be ignored7. 
Even when the medical discourse goes beyond the bio-
logical aspects and moves towards the psychological and 
social factors of health-disease process, these factors often 
only orbit the disease, following the logic highlighted by 
Foucault4, Goldman, and Ausiello13 argue that physicians 
must understand the individual as a person, “understand 
the social situation of the patient, family issues, finan-
cial concerns, and preferences for different types of care 
and outcomes”, but they do not deviate from the history/
physical examination model aimed at signs and symptoms 
that may define a disease; thus, the psychosocial aspects 
are related to patients who serve as “home” for diseases. 
Starfield17 argues that “effective medical attention is not 
limited to the treatment of illness itself ” and cites the 
context as a factor to be considered, but assigns to health 
services the primary task of investigating the “cause of ill-
nesses and the management of diseases”. 
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With the same desire to pursue a higher power from 
the Clinic, other initiatives were implemented, such as the 
humanization of medical practices; the person-centered 
medicine, considered “as a whole regarding emotional 
needs and existential issues”18; the Balint groups; and the 
Extended Clinical Care10.
According to McWhinney and Freeman19, “the per-
son-centered clinical method provides a systematic and 
integrated approach to include the person and the dis-
ease”. It is an alternative proposal to the family and com-
munity doctor, as in 35% to 50% of visits in this area it 
is not possible to establish a specific diagnosis of a dis-
ease. The solution of these cases lies in the belief that they 
could be “treated” by understanding the person and the 
context. These authors distinguish “disease” from “expe-
rience with the disease”. The first would be a “pathologi-
cal process that physicians use as an explanatory model 
of experience with the disease”; that is, “what the patient 
is experiencing when he goes to the doctor; the disease is 
what the patient has after visiting a doctor”. This dis-
tinction means considering the disease both from the 
standpoint of meaning for the person’s life and from 
the standpoint of pathology. The person-centered method 
is aimed at understanding the experience with the disease 
at all levels, from pathology to thoughts and feelings19.
Ruben et al.20 also use the English clearer distinc-
tion between illness and disease to defend the extended 
approach of the person. According to McWhinney and 
Freeman19, illness corresponds to the experience with 
disease: “It is the unique and singular way in which a 
person is affected by the disease”. Disease is a mental 
construct created to deal with the biological problems 
more easily. It is individual-independent and follows the 
logic of pathophysiological reasoning. Except when the 
disease is in its non-illness stage; i.e., it is asymptomatic 
or still unknown by the patient, coexisting with illness 
in the same person. These authors consider that an es-
sential characteristic of family medicine is to incorporate 
the illness in the patient approach. Similarly to Starfield17, 
others suggest that, for the specialist, one single Clinic 
would be enough for the disease, whereas the primary 
care professional, more specifically the family doctor, 
needs to include the illness or experience with the dis-
ease in his Clinic.
In its 2008 World Health Report “Primary Health-
care: Now More Than Ever”, the World Health Organi-
zation emphasizes the importance of person-centered 
care and also points out differences between the prob-
lems addressed in primary and secondary levels, under-
standing as a more complex challenge the one imposed 
on primary care. This is because people must be under-
stood holistically in their physical, emotional, and social 
development, and must be placed in a world with its own 
changeable characteristics in time21. Besides benefiting 
the patient, the person-centered strategy seems to in-
crease health professional’s satisfaction.
After noting the difficulty of doctors with the emo-
tional problems of their patients, the psychiatrist/psy- 
choanalyst Michael Balint organized seminars on 
“psychological problems in clinical medicine” and pro-
posed the extended interview based in the ability of lis-
tening by the doctor, deeming it necessary to expand the 
limits of anamnesis11. In these lines, Cunha proposes a 
different clinical anamnesis “giving space to the ideas 
and words of the patient”5 and Bedrikow argues that the 
dynamics of consultation “must be freed from the rigid 
rules of traditional anamnesis and open space to a less 
structured conversation”1. In such cases, the limits of 
the traditional clinical method connected to the modern 
scientific thinking are recognized, in which the patient 
in his doctor-patient relationship is led by the physician 
through a script able to reach the name of a disease. The 
authors mentioned above, following in the footsteps of 
Campos, understand that the patient, “free” to develop 
and convey ideas, may add different elements to the 
Clinic, with the possibility of bringing out other issues 
than his illness. The patient (under such conditions) is 
allowed to achieve higher coefficients of autonomy and 
initiative, with a more prominent role. This is the starting 
point of the Clinic of the Subject, thought by Campos, 
from Sartre’s Existentialism – the subject responsible for 
the “construction of meaning or significance to things or 
phenomena” – and from Basaglia’s “role of concrete sub-
jects”, for whom the objective of the work is the patient, 
the person, not the disease10. Also according to Campos, 
“the modern clinic reform should be based on a shift in 
the emphasis from disease and be focused on the con-
crete Subject; in this case, a subject carrying a disease”10. 
In his conception of Clinic, even transferring to the 
patient the role of the ontologized object of medicine, 
the disease continues to exist, “it is there in the body, 
all the time, making noise, breaking the silence of the or-
gans. The disease is there, depending on doctors and med-
icine, it is true, but also independent of medicine; depend-
ing on people’s will to live, for sure, but also independent 
of the Subject’s will”10. At this point, Campos agrees with 
Foucault in recognizing that the Clinic provides always a 
disease which inhabits an individual. There would be no 
Clinic without disease, “otherwise it would not be Clinic, 
but sociology or existential philosophy”10. Here is the spec- 
ificity of Campos; he does not propose to replace the dis-
ease by the patient, but to expand the object of knowl-
edge and clinical intervention, including also the Subject 
and its Context, because “similar illness in terms of clas-
sification may occur differently depending on the history 
and subjective resources and materials of each Subject”. 
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The Subject inclusion as the object of the Clinic chal-
lenges the paradigm of positive science, which draws on 
the regularity of diseases and has difficulty addressing the 
uniqueness of cases22.
We could analyze the different clinical methods by plac-
ing these methods into two main streams: one focusing on 
disease – the Clinic described by Foucault, the Positive Sci-
ence, the Official Clinic10; the Clinic of Treaties Medicine 
and Semiotechnique (Cecil, Ramos Jr.). And another fo-
cused on the meanings, emotions, and uniqueness of each 
person – the Clinic of the Subject (Basaglia and Campos)10; 
the Person-Centered Medicine (Brown, McWhinney, and 
Freeman); and the Listening Clinic of Psychological Prob-
lems (Balint). This separation follows the description of 
two school of thought made  by Crooskshank: the natural/
descriptive and the conventional/academic/ontological 
approach to medical knowledge, followed by the Ancient 
Greek schools of Cos and Cnidus, respectively. The natural 
approach is concerned with body and illness and describes 
the experience with the disease in all its dimensions, while 
the conventional approach is concerned with organs and 
diseases, seeking to classify and name the disease as an inde-
pendent entity separate from the person. These are the two 
“doctrines that are endlessly repeated over the centuries”19.
The modern Clinic born in the 18th century, described 
by Foucault, and taught in Western medical schools 
until the present day has a close relationship with the 
conventional/academic/ontological school of thought 
followed by the group of Cnidus who “understood diseases 
as entities independent of the patient, which needed to 
be classified and distinguished from each other, focusing 
its activity in the diagnosis […] medicine was taught and 
learned as a science”23. The Clinic of the Subject, person-
centered, interested in meanings and affects has more 
identification with the school of Cos with its natural/
descriptive approach, which “interpreted the disease 
within the specific and peculiar condition of each patient 
and the symptoms as independent of environmental and 
personal factors; the disease is an abstraction because 
the symptoms vary continuously in the course of a single 
disease, and the patient is the real problem of medicine [...] 
medicine should be taught and learned as an art to treat 
the sick human being”23. Crookshank19 noted that “the best 
doctors at any time balanced the two methods”. The idea 
that there is no single truth and that different methods 
can coexist, enhancing each other, should be one of the 
main strategies of health managers. In this sense, it seems 
to me very fortunate the preface of the Final Report of the 
Workshop on Primary Care of the City of Campinas when 
using the following sentence from the book by Marguerite 
Yourcenar Memoirs of Hadrian: “There is more than one 
truth. And all are important to the world. There is no harm 
in alternating”24. 
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